The multicultural dilemma: between normative and practical reasoning by Marco Antonsich (1251417)
 1
The multicultural dilemma  
between normative and practical reasoning 
 
Marco Antonsich 
Central European University 
 
 
‘The multicultural dilemma’, i.e., how to reconcile equal dignity with difference, is 
the central question around which Randi Gressgård’s book revolves. As a way to 
excavate the conceptual underpinnings of this dilemma, Gressgård embarks in a rich 
philosophical journey through the texts of, among others, Kant, Lyotard, Lash, Gadamer, 
Falzon, and Kögler. Her writing strategy is one which expressly tries to let the others 
speak in her text, avoiding the elevation of the central thinking ‘I’ (p. xiii). This strategy, 
she maintains, is in line with her theoretical argument for an open dialogue, respectful of 
difference, which, as I will explain below, is her ‘solution’ to the multicultural dilemma. 
I should say that if, on the one hand, I sympathize with the rationale of this strategy, 
on the other hand, I have at times found myself a bit lost and confused while following 
Gressgård’s philosophical journey. Being used to traditional academic writing, where the 
‘I’ of the author continuously steps in to tell the reader where s/he stands, in the case of 
Gressgård I struggled to find her voice and therefore to locate the relevance of other 
authors’ reasoning within her main line of argument. It is comforting to think, though, 
that a feeling of being lost and confused can resonate, in Gressgård, with a sense of lack 
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or inadequacy of our intellectual categories, which in turn is the necessary condition for 
an open dialogue… 
At risk of elevating my ‘I’, there are two major points which nonetheless I would 
like to make in relation to Gressgård’s book. The first concerns her preference for a 
theoretical approach versus an empirical one. The theoretical approach adopted by 
Gressgård is indeed one which “frees the analysis from the constraints of what empirical 
analysis by itself is able to reveal” (p. xii). Such a theoretical approach is thus able “to 
illuminate and discuss otherwise unchallenged assumptions that are constitutive of 
multiculturalism and multicultural dialogue” (p. xii). I should say that I am a bit 
perplexed about this division between the theoretical and the empirical, as I believe in the 
mutually constituent relationship between these two dimensions. By overlooking 
empirical analysis, one indeed risks falling prey of the seductive power of the inner logic 
of the theoretical reasoning itself, with its pure, linear, consequential way of putting all 
the pieces together, so to speak. We all know that reality is much more dirty, messy and 
inconsequential. The problem here is not only with the logical incongruence between a 
theoretical ‘solution’ (being open to difference) and a practical problem (the multicultural 
dilemma), but with the accuracy of a theoretical reasoning which is not informed by 
empirical analysis. Let me make a few examples to explain this point.  
Following Falzon (1998), Gressgård argues that we are in a position to be open to 
dialogue when our prevailing categories are being challenged by the ‘other’ (p. 129). 
While this is the logical conclusion of her theoretical reasoning, in practice we often 
observe a defensive, xenophobic attitude exactly when economic, social, and cultural 
certainties are challenged by the ‘other’ (Brader et al. 2008; Citrin and Sides 2008). Even 
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if we accept that this empirical finding might not per se invalidate the theoretical 
argument for an open dialogue in the context of an ‘identity crisis’, it demands 
nevertheless a more refined theoretical argument, which specifies, for instance, under 
which conditions an open dialogue might take place. Far from being a ‘constraint’, the 
empirical can ‘illuminate’ further the theory. 
Similarly, I believe that Gressgård’s theoretical reasoning on the 
assimilation/culturalisation of the ‘other’ could have benefited from the empirical 
analysis on the actual dynamics of the assimilation process. In fact, as the rich literature 
on neo-assimilation has shown (see, for instance, Alba and Nee 1997), assimilation is not 
necessarily a forced condition, as migrants themselves are active subjects in the process 
of ‘becoming similar’ (Brubaker 2001; Nagel 2009). This points to the theoretical 
relevance of the agency of the ‘other’ – a dimension only marginally discussed in the 
book and always in terms of potential resistance to assimilation. Taking into account the 
desire of the ‘other’ to become ‘the Same’ would certainly open the multicultural 
dilemma to new and different theoretical questions. 
The second point which I want to make is closely tied with the first one and 
concerns Gressgård’s ‘solution’ to the multicultural dilemma. Gressgård explicitly aims 
to move beyond the liberal, universalist notion of equality and the cultural relativist 
notion of distinctiveness, since, according to her, both converge in a process of ethno-
centric assimilation and culturalisation/subordination of the ‘other’. On the one hand, in 
fact, the liberal notion of equality assumes a universal, modern, de-culturalised subject as 
a principle of both inclusive humanity and dominant moral universe, against which any 
heterogeneity is excluded. In other words, since the cultural order of modern liberal 
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Western societies is granted a universal status with an exclusive right to define equality, 
those who are not identified with this universal civic public are repressed, subordinated, 
assimilated or excluded. As such, the liberal ideal of individual equality translates into an 
ethno-centric principle which justifies inequality (p. 38-40). On the other hand, the 
cultural relativism practiced by multiculturalism is, for Gressgård, equally to blame, since 
it “constantly run[s] the risk of assimilating the unspeakable into existing norms of 
dominance by way of managing and regulating difference, often in name of tolerance” (p. 
136). To put it differently, multiculturalism, by consolidating separate cultural spheres, 
amounts to the preservation of the marginality of minority cultures by a dominating 
majority culture (p. 135). 
How to escape this dilemma? As already anticipated, Gressgård’s ‘solution’, 
following Lash (1999), Derrida and Lyotard, is an unconditional openness towards the 
‘other’, the unknown, the event, the ‘arrivant’, or the ‘forgotten’ which accompanies any 
identity-formation process (p. 85-86). ‘Living with lack’, with an awareness of the 
limitations and inadequacy of our cognitive and evaluative capacities, is then the 
condition for a community based on difference rather than identity. In this sense, as long 
as dominant cultural forms are aware of their finitude and historicity and recognize 
different ways of thinking and acting (p. 137), it is possible “to be together without 
‘common being’”, “to be bonded without bonds” (p. 85). 
Having followed Gressgård all along her challenging philosophical journey, I 
should confess that I was a bit disappointed to end up onto this very familiar terrain. Her 
‘solution’ to the multicultural dilemma is indeed something heard often times in the 
literature on multiculturalism (e.g., Kymlicka 2011). Why to embark in such a long 
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journey to then arrive at the same, very familiar place where others, who have embarked 
in similar journeys, have already landed? I know that usually the merry is in the journey 
itself; but it is also nice to think sometimes that our journey could lead us to undiscovered 
terrains… True, Gressgård refuses any problem-solving approach (p. 12); she is not after 
‘solutions’ (“I do not intend to develop a new model for dialogue”, p. 12). Yet, she 
clearly puts forward a model of thought (being open to difference), which, at least to me, 
seems pretty close to a ‘solution’. If so, how feasible is this ‘solution’? How to move 
from the theoretical, normative level to the practical, empirical or political level? 
Interestingly, Gressgård also asks these same questions (p. 86, 105), but leave them 
unanswered, as her quest is indeed exclusively theoretical. But even if we remain within a 
theoretical perspective, how does her philosophical model of thought cater for those 
(often the majority in our societies) who refuse to be open to dialogue? How can 
communities based on difference be more inclusive when they actually exclude those 
who do not have the intellectual/emotive resources to be open to the arrivant? Are these 
‘others’ less morally valuable that the traditional ‘other’ (i.e., the diverse in terms of 
gender, ethnicity, religion, sex, etc.)? 
Gressgård’s book is certainly a stimulating philosophical journey into the often 
taken-for-granted notions of the multicultural debate; but it is also a journey which stops 
where the dirt road of real life starts. However ‘illuminating’ her journey might be, it is 
therefore a partial one, in need of being ‘grounded’. 
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